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Dec 8, 2003 One of the running jokes of economist Murray N. Rothbard is that when you hear “social” being used as an adjective, move the appropriate hand to the pocket containing your wallet, because it’s in the process of being picked. A more cynical person would say: when the word “social” is being used, carry around the wallet with the counterfeit bills. Though I know quite well that the more physical counterpart of this countermeasure (broadly defined) is actionable now. Twentieth century North America has seen the use of the word “social” as a normative principle: being “social” is ethically good, while being “anti-social” has been considered a sin. Interestingly enough, the same century has seen “martinet” being used continually as a term of abuse, even if the pragmatic element in their respective moral codes are similar. The “social” ethic is simple in its semantical form. People that are judged “social” spend time socializing instead of working their guts out or otherwise being reclusive. Since socializing is good, the acquisition of social skills is considered walking on the path of virtue. Thus, being easygoing, tolerant (both endomorph’s virtues), good at listening, empathetic, helpful to members of your social group, and non- judgmental of those members is considered to be virtuous. The corresponding vices are being: high- strung, perfectionistic, loudmouthy, “adamantinely selfish”, miserly or secretive, and judgmental. And the original sin element is deeply Pascalian: “all men by nature hate each other,” which translates into “all men are anti-social by inclination.” Since the division point between right and wrong is the making of enemies – with the important exception of “social losers,” who basically have to be shunned out of principle – it becomes easy to see who’s the saint and who’s the sinner in a group that believes in the “social ethic.” Has anyone acted like an “anti-social jerk,” according to the testimony of a social creature of good form? Punishments, as I’m sure you know, tend to be pragmatic in nature too. As long as you are virtuous by the above standard, “loser” is just a tease or a warning. Only people that are a considered a permanent pain are exiled to Loser Land. There are not the traditional Christian virtues. Being loudmouthy and judgmental makes one’s fellow Christians suspicious, of course, but if the one doing the hectoring has in fact cast the motes out of his or her eye, he or she will be valued for standing up for what’s right. And as far as “perfectionistic” is concerned, the Christian is expected to acknowledge that all men are sinners at heart, but striving for moral perfection is encouraged, a lot. As far as high- strung and miserly are concerned, Christianity considers them vicious too, but Christian sins are fundamentally different: they tend to stigmatize aggression and unrestrained sexuality. I was raised to follow the social ethic: one of the criticisms by my father, to my face, of my own character was that I was “below average” in “socializing.” This was matched by my behavior at the time I heard it, which was at the age of either five or six. So naturally, I worried seriously about the social ethic’s equivalent of the Old Adam – being “abnormal” in behavior, in habits. As is usual for an ethic, this potential source of sin is there to be eliminated from your behavior, as much as you can, consistent with your life situation. I didn’t qualify to be one of the social elect – the party guy – but this I chalked up to my own deficits. So I really “bought into” this way of life. What’s curious about this kind of ethic is a clash between the social position of its adherents and a Nietzschean analysis of its code. A Nietzschean would say that this is the morality of the herd (slave morality) in a raw, and perhaps pure, form – but anyone seeing the group I was in would clearly identify me and my peers as upper-middle class. There seems something strange about a group of people destined for the professional and affluent sections of society acting as Nietzsche’s slaves, now isn’t there? The only way to reconcile the two would be to say that the combination of the two makes people in the upper-middle class segment of society politically insecure. They would be inclined to either blame the upper classes for all their lack of spine – to see the upper classes as “anti- social” – or else they would be terrified of people without the restraints they themselves had to learn during the school years. This, normally, is expressed by fear of the mesomorphic type of physical worker, as the social ethic does place real taboos upon its members against calling the cops or other authorities. Being branded a recalcitrant snitch was enough to put you on the total-loser list back then and there. The above means that the guy that’s good with his fists, is aggressive, and doesn’t give a damn about whether or not he’s “intolerant” is feared by the social set. The enemy tends to be cast as a “self-righteous Christian,” even though there is an element of fanaticism in this, as the big boy who can trump the charge of “anti-social” with a class-resentment grudge that carries successfully in the political world usually doesn’t hail from the lands of the “extreme right wing.” He comes from another part of town. An engineer type would note at this point that there seems to be something wrong with the machinery. The dumping pipe clearly is shooting the waste to the wrong tank. This make the above ethic socially flawed, because of this element of scapegoating. Remember that making enemies where and when you shouldn’t is considered a vice in this code. There’s another, interior, flaw that was revealed as the twentieth century ended. Since Nietzsche provides good reason to despise the social set, a kid full of his Nietzsche can snitch at will provided he’s cunning about it – and his disdain makes it impossible for the rest of the group to control him. Why should he worry seriously about the snoot coming from the mouths of people that are obviously “slaves”? And doesn’t the exercise of “strategic snitching” harmonize with the free exercise of one’s will to power? This is what’s making the social ethic crack apart: successful vampirism from within, with Nietzsche as its psychological backing. It’s only a matter of time before the “Party Guy” becomes a mere fop, like the 1920s’ sheik and flapper, and is replaced by a new kind of winner, with a new kind of partially pragmatic code under his or her belt. Since bodybuilding is now durably cool, and mesomorphism is edging out ectomorphism as glamorous, the most probable guess as to what code will succeed the code of the social butterfly is none other than...the code of the martinet. All it would take would be an intellectualization of this way of life to make the social ethic obsolete. ------------ Email Daniel M. Ryan: danielmryan@sprint.ca Comment on this column in the forum. Tell a friend about this site! ------------ |
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