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Jan. 7, 2010 Eight CIA members killed, eleven others wounded. Most media, analysts and opinion makers concentrate on security and why the suicide bomber was not searched before entering Forward Operating Base Chapman. What they have ignored is the almost total ineffectiveness of American intelligence in the Afghan-Pakistani region. Operating out of fortified compounds, the supposedly secret organization may as well have flashing neon signs saying: CIA base, welcome! The military disguise is not an effective cover to go out and try to recruit agents who will provide information on the enemy. Few, if any Afghans are willing to be seen talking to Americans, never mind becoming paid agents. Since American intelligence is blind, it has to rely on friendly services, This is commonly called liaison operations. In this particular case, Jordanian Intelligence provided, Hamman Khalil Al Balawi, a man they had arrested and supposedly turned. To have an agent with excellent credentials as a jihad supporter with connections and who is willing to work for you is the intelligence officer’s dream. Recruiting and handling such an asset is what careers and legends are made of and inspire espionage novelists. As Balawi’s Jordanian handler, Captain Ali Bin Zeid’s career was about to skyrocket. The agent was important enough to generate interest among CIA high-ranking officers in Afghanistan. Apparently Balawi made contact with the CIA, was given instructions and left on his mission to locate Bin Ladin’s sidekick. Several weeks later, Balawi returned to Khost, and re-established communications with the CIA. Debriefing him was important enough that A CIA officer from Kabul flew to Khost, the Khost Base Chief also wanted to be present. Captain Bin Zeid, also was there. At least eight people. That is a mob scene for an intelligence meeting. When using proper tradecraft, this kind of debriefing would take place in a discreet safe-house. The agent’s handler and a CIA officer would be present. In Afghanistan the CIA doesn’t have safe-houses. It just isn’t safe enough. Bringing an agent into a known CIA base watched by the enemy is crazy. Whoever went to pick up Balawi had to act fast. Pick up the agent from the street and take him inside without the Taliban or others, including local civilian employees working inside the base identifying Balawi. Al Qaida knew this. The opportunity to decapitate the CIA leadership in Afghanistan was too good to miss. Whether Al Qaida planned this bombing a year ago in Jordan or seized the opportunity when Balawi showed up in Afghanistan, probably will never be known.
For those interested to know how intelligence is carried out in the field, the handling of agents, turning agents, triple agents, I invite you to read Kingmaker, a novel, which shows it all.
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