HOME | FUNNY ARTICLES | TOP NEWS REPORTS | SUBMIT
|
July 24, 2009 I have been reading a host of stuff lately concerning Afghanistan now that Obama is in charge. One of the most interesting books I have read on the subject is 'Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond' by Abdulakader H. Sinno. He takes the position that no one fights for his country, or even for a cause, but is dragged into war in order to protect himself and his family. The side on which one fights dictated by what is the best for them at the time, and as far into the future as can be imagined. He roams the world and history as he expounds his point that guerrilla war is the only option for most when fighting against highly sophisticated technology based forces. Mao, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh and others of the ilk have based their strategies upon being ‘like fish in water able to swim unseen among people’. He cites the British counter approach in Malaya, the Dafar region of the middle East and in Northern Ireland where a strong centralized force countered the above using a ‘Hearts and Mind’ strategy. Neutral and pro-government forces were distinguished from anti-government forces thus preventing recruitment into the guerrilla force. This is not to be confused with the present effort in Afghanistan as there is a need in this type of warfare to have a centralized command structure in order to bring about a steady flow of intelligence, a thing not possible in a decentralized situation, intelligence agencies loath to share information even with allies. The incumbent forces fighting in Afghanistan are decentralized, the three main groups, NATO, ISAF and the US Army complemented by the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National police and the plethora of private security forces, both western and Afghan. In his book an equation has been worked out. In order to prevail against a strong centralized incumbent the guerrilla must be decentralized as it is then like a many headed snake, able to continue when some of them have been cut off, the incumbent, as in Vietnam, growing weary enough to give up. However to deliver a knock out blow they must be centralized as they need to be sufficiently co-ordinated.This is the time when they are most vulnerable to a centralized incumbent as they now have only one head, a decapitation usually bringing about the defeat of the insurgency. In Malaya the decapitation stroke was the defection of Chin Peng, the leader of the Communist Terrorists, to the British. In the Dafar region it was the British Mercenaries system of isolating the common peasant from the land owning aristocracy before leading the tribe’s men to victory in decisive battle. In Northern Ireland it was the intelligence work identifing leading IRA members brought about by using a highly centralized command structure.
My own thoughts on the matter are that western forces have become far too technological. War in Afghanistan was conducted by the Russians and British of the nineteenth century from horse back and on foot. It’s all very well to state that no one has ever conquered Afghanistan any way so why bring that up. Well that is not strictly true as Alexander,Tamarlane, Genghis Khan and others have and while the Russians and British were not technically in place upon the land of Afghanistan most of the time they did dictate its foreign policy. It would be well to study a less sophisticated army; that of Pakistan for instance. Pakistan is one of the poorest countries in the world but did within a few months clear out the Taliban from its north western province. These soldiers were not mounted upon armoured personnel carriers nor did they have access to sophisticated reconnaissance vehicle and main battle tanks but still managed to decisively defeat the Taliban. Less armoured vehicles less targets for IED squads. In this case lack of technology seemed to be the deciding factor, training and discipline giving the incumbent the edge over the tribesmen. Maybe the west has something to learn from the Pakistani Army.
|
||||||
|
|
|||||||
|
